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This study aims to investigate empirically the effect of accrual earnings management and real 
earnings management on firm value. The analysis technique used is multiple linear regression analysis. 
The research samples were manufacturing firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 
of 2013 to 2017. The analysis tool used is Multiple Linear Regression. The test results showed that 
accrual earnings management measured by discretionary accruals did not affect on value of the firm. Real 
earnings management was found to have a negative effect on firm value. 
 





Firm value is one of the important components for firms, especially public firms. The market can 
assess the firm's performance using firm value (Mahendra et al., 2012), if the firm is considered to have 
an attractive value, investors will be interested in investing in the firm. Therefore, the firm has a high 
motivation to increase the value of its firm. Firm value is one indicator to assess the success of a firm. The 
value of the firm is related to the firm's stock price (Fama, 1978), therefore the prosperity of shareholders 
can be seen from the value of the firm. High firm value shows a higher level of prosperity for its 
shareholders. Stock prices can be a measure of the value of the firm because it is considered to reflect the 
true value of the firm's assets. Firms need to keep the value of the firm attractive to attract investors. If the 
value of the firm falls, it shows that investor confidence in the firm also decreases and will threaten the 
survival of the firm. 
 
The owner of the firm needs another party that has the competence to manage the firm so that the 
value of the firm can increase. Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976) explains that firm owners 
(principals) employ other people, namely managers (agents) to do work in accordance with the interests 
of the owner of the firm. Manager can then be assessed for performance from the profit figures achieved 
in a certain period. Succeeding in exceeding the profit target, the manager will be considered to perform 
well and the market will respond positively to the results of the achievement Signaling Theory explains 
that information that is considered good news by the market will be responded positively, increasing 
stock prices and firm value. also explained that the reported profit of the manager would be able to 
increase the value of the firm, if the manager did not succeed in achieving the profit target, the manager 
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would be considered not performing well and would be economically sanctioned until the contract was 
terminated by the owner of the firm. Managers are said to be concerned with self-interests (Esenhardt, 
1989) will tend to avoid sanctions by trying to reach profit targets in opportunistic ways. The 
opportunistic way to get the desired profit tag is called earnings management. 
 
Earnings management is a choice of accounting policies or concrete actions that affect income so 
that it can achieve certain profit goals reported in financial statements (Scott, 2015; 445). Earnings 
management carried out using accounting policies is called accrual earnings management, while earnings 
management carried out through the firm's real operational activities is called real earnings management. 
These practices are used by managers to achieve certain profits so that it will have an impact on market 
valuation and ultimately the value of the firm. 
 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999) earnings management can occur when managers use 
valuation and structuring transactions to change financial statements so that some parties mislead the 
firm's economic performance or influence contractual agreements that depend on accounting figures. 
Accrual earnings management has an accrual reverse in the period after manipulation. The increase in 
profit at this time will result in a decrease in profits in the next period. Conversely, a decrease in current 
profits generated through the accrual method will result in an increase in profits in the next period. 
Earnings management through the accrual method does not affect the firm's cash flow. Accrual can be 
divided into two components, namely non-discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals. Non-
discretionary accruals are accruals that are determined by the normal economic conditions of the firm 
(Xiong, 2006). Discretionary accruals are accruals that are not regulated in the contract and are the 
manager's choice policy. Therefore, discretionary accruals are assumed to be the result of manager's 
opportunism.  
 
Earnings management is carried out by managers to obtain the desired profit, one of the goals is 
to mislead the market regarding the actual performance of the firm (Caylor et al., 2015). When the market 
cannot detect manager's opportunistic behavior, the market will assume the profit figures presented by 
managers are a result of good performance. Ridawan and Hunardi (2013), Indriani et al., (2014), and 
Susanto and Christiawan (2016) found that accrual earnings management carried out by managers 
managed to mislead the market and have a positive impact on firm value. When the market is less 
sophisticated and does not analyze information in advance whether an information is valid or not 
(Marfuah, 2006). In contrast to the previous findings of Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006), Siallagan 
(2009), and Abbas et al., (2017) it was found that when managers generate profits by manipulation the 
market will give a negative response so that it can reduce the value of the firm. In line with the statement 
stated by Hartono (2017: 614-615) before giving a response to information published by managers, a 
sophisticated market will first analyze the validity of that information. If information on published 
earnings is detected obtained through earnings management, the market will react negatively by reducing 
the value of the firm. In addition to positive and negative themes from previous literature Challen and 
Siregar (2012) and Dewi et al., (2016) found no relationship between accrual earnings management and 
firm value. This study expects that accrual earnings management will have a negative impact on firm 
value. 
 
Real earnings management is another action choice that managers can choose to obtain the 
desired profit target. Real earnings management is a practice that deviates from the normal operation of 
the firm carried out by managers to mislead some stakeholders to believe that the reporting objectives 
have been fulfilled in normal operations (Rowchowdhury, 2006). Real earnings management has 
advantages over accrual earnings management which is not easily detected by regulators or auditors and it 
is easier to achieve the desired profit target. The disadvantage of real earnings management is that the 
worse impact is due to the firm's future cash flow. Therefore, this manipulation must be really anticipated 
by stakeholders because it endangers the survival of the firm. Managers have different considerations in 
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choosing both earnings manipulation techniques, managers also tend to use both techniques to achieve the 
desired profit target (Zang, 2012). Earnings management can be done in three ways (Roychowdhury, 
2006), namely; sales manipulation, manipulation by reducing discretionary expenses, and manipulation 
through the production process by overproduction. 
 
Ferdawati (2009) found that real earnings management has a positive effect on firm value. The 
market has not succeeded in detecting this manipulation practice so that it misleads the market and gives a 
wrong assessment to the firm. On the other hand, Partami et al. (2015) actually found that real earnings 
management had a negative impact on firm value. This finding is in line with the statement of 
Rowchowdhury (2006) which states that real earnings management can reduce firm value because this 
form of earnings manipulation can increase profits in the current period but has a very bad impact on the 
firm's future cash flows. Therefore, earnings management is different from accrual earnings management 
which only expects reversal accruals. This worse impact will make the market more anticipate the form of 
manipulation through real activities so as not to mislead them and provide a negative reaction if the firm 
is indicated to practice real earnings management. This study expects that real earnings management has a 
negative impact on firm value. 
 
This study aims to test and analyze empirically as to what the impact of accrual earnings 
management and real earnings management by managers on firm value. The research samples used were 
manufacturing firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2013 to 2017. In addition, researchers 
also included control variables that could have an impact on firm values namely firm size, leverage, 




Sample and Data 
 
The initial sample of this study was all manufacturing firms listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) during the period 2013 to 2017. The selection of manufacturing firms is related to one 
measure of real earnings management, namely production costs, which are only found in manufacturing 
firms. The sample was then selected using a purposive sampling method with criteria namely; 1) Firms 
that use the rupiah currency in annual financial statements, 2) The firm publishes the data needed in this 
study in full. 3) The firm did not experience losses during the observation period. A summary of the 
results of the sample selection process is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Result sample selection 
No Kriteria Sampel 
Jumlah 
Perusahaan 
1 Manufacturing firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2013-
2017 
123 
2 Do not use rupiah currency on annual financial statements 18 
3 Incomplete published data 6 
4 The firm suffered a loss 45 
  Total 54 
  Total Observation for 5 Years 270 
 
The data used is a secondary data category. Sources of financial data are obtained from financial 
statements published on the official website of the Indonesia Stock Exchange (www.idx.co.id) and the 
firm's website. Market data used to calculate firm value is obtained from the Yahoo Finance website 
(http://finance.yahoo.com). Yahoo Finance is a world-class corporate news and business information web 
site originating from America and a business division of the Yahoo firm. 
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Dependent variable is firm value. Measuring the value of a firm using the Tobin’s Q Ratio 






Q  = Firm value 
MVE  = equity market value 
BVE  = equity book value 
D  = Book value of total debt. 
 
The dependent variable is accrual earnings management and real earnings management. Accrual 
earnings management is an act of managers who utilize the flexibility of accounting standards to obtain 
certain profit targets and can mislead several stakeholders. The proxy used as accrual earnings 
management is discretionary accrual. Discretionary accrual measurement uses the Modified Jones Model 
by (Dechow et al., 1995). The Modified Jones Model modifies Jones (1991) model by adding changes in 
trade accounts receivable on the model because the accounts receivable are part of discretionary accruals 




TACCi.t = Total accruals of firm i in year t. 
NDACCi,t = Total accruals of non-discretionary firms i in year t. 
DACCi,t = Total discretionary accruals firms i in year t. 
NIi,t   = Net profit before the outpost of firm costs i in year t. 
CFOi,t  = Cash flow operating activities of the firm i in year t. 
∆REVi,t = Changes in firm income i in year t. 
∆RECi,t = Changes in firm receivables i in year t. 
PPEi,t  = firm fixed assets (property, plant and equipment) i in year t. 
Ai,t-1  = Total assets of firm i in year t-1 
ɛi,t  = Error 
 
Real earnings management is earnings manipulation through the firm's real operational activities 
that can affect future cash flows to obtain desired profits in the current period. Measurement of real 
earnings management follows the Rowchowdhury (2006) model by dividing the size of real earnings 
management into three, namely; abnormal operating cash flow, abnormal production costs, and abnormal 
discretionary expenses. Measurements for each measure of real earnings management are as follows; 
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Production costs are the sum of cost of goods sold with changes in inventory period t. Production 








The coefficients obtained in each model are re-entered into the model to obtain the normal 
amount of operating cash flow, production costs, and discretionary expenses. Then the actual value of the 
operating cash flow, production costs, and discretionary expenses are subtracted by the normal value to 
obtain the abnormal value of each measurement used as a proxy for real earnings management. Each 
value is summed according to the Cohen et al., (2008) model, then abnormal operating cash flows and 
abnormal discretionary costs are multiplied by -1 to equalize the relationship with real earnings 
management. The real earnings management model is estimated using the following model; 
 
REM = (ACFO*-1) + APROD + (ADISEXP*-1) 
Where, 
CFOt  = Cash flow from operation firm i in year t. 
PRODt  = Production cost of firm i in year t. 
DISEXPt = Discretionary expenses of firm i in year t. 
ACFO  = Abnormal cash flow from operation. 
APROD = Abnormal production cost. 
ADISEXP = Abnormal discretionary expenses. 
REM  = A combined measure of real earnings management. 
At-1  = Total assets of firm i in year t-1. 
St  = Total sales of firm i in year t. 
∆St  = Changes in sales of firm i in year t. 
∆St-1  = Changes in firm sales i in year t-1. 
ɛt   = Error. 
 
The effect of earnings management on firm value can be influenced by other variables so that it 
needs to be included as a control variable into the regression model. This study includes the size of the 
firm to control the characteristics of the firm. Carter et al., (2003) and Prasetyorini (2013) have shown 
that firm size has a positive effect on firm value. Firms that have large sizes can increase market 
confidence and are considered to have lower risks because large firms have better financial and human 
resources, as well as more sophisticated management systems. Firm size is measured using the natural 
logarithm of total assets. The leverage ratio is used as a control variable to control the market response to 
the firm's financial condition. Nekhili et al., (2017) and Aggarwal and Padhan (2017) found that leverage 
has a negative effect on the market value of a firm. Firms that have a high level of debt are considered by 
the market to have a higher risk so that investment is less attractive. Leverage is estimated to use by 
dividing total debt by the total assets of the firm. Return on assets (ROA) is used to control the level of 
profitability of a firm. Previous research conducted by Marsha and Murtqi (2017) and Rosikah et al., 
(2018) shows that ROA can increase firm value. High profitability ratios show good corporate 
performance so that they are attracted by the market. ROA is measured by the formula for net income 
divided by the total assets of the firm. Finally, audit quality is an independent party that can be a control 
mechanism and reduce agency conflicts that occur between firms and stakeholders outside the firm. Many 
studies have shown the influence of audit quality on firm value (Afza and Nazir, 2013; Wang and Huang, 
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2014; and Ugwunta et al., 2018). High quality audits increase market confidence in the credibility of 
financial statements presented by the firm. Audit quality is measured using a dummy variable of value 1 if 
the firm is audited by big-4 auditors and 0 for firms audited by non-Big-4 auditors following (DeAngelo, 




Multiple linear regression approach is used to empirically examine the effect of accrual earnings 
management and real earnings management and control variables on firm value. Testing is done using 
IBM SPSS Statistics 21 software. Taking conclusions on the test results uses a 95% confidence value. 
Alternative hypotheses are supported if the significance value is less than 0.05 or 5%. The research 
regression model is built as follows; 
 
Q = α0 + β1DACC + β2REM + β3SIZE + β4LEV + β5ROA + β6AUD + ɛ 
Where, 
Q  = Firm value i in period t, 
DACC = Enterprise discretionary i in period t, 
REM = Management of firm real earnings i in period t, 
SIZE  = Natural logarithm of total assets i in period t, 
LEV  = Firm debt ratio i in period t, 
ROA  = Return on Asset ratio of firm i in period t, 
AUD  = Dummy variable of audit quality firm i in period t, 
ɛ  = Error. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive statistical analysis was conducted to obtain an overview of the initial characteristics 
of the variables studied. Analysis includes average values, minimum values, maximum values, and 
standard deviations. Data variables analyzed included firm value, accrual earnings management, real 
earnings management, firm size, leverage ratio, Return on Assets, and audit quality. Table 2 presents the 
results of testing descriptive statistical analysis. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics result 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
Q 270 1.5053 0.93411 0.29 4.92 
DACC 270 0.0527 0.12919 -0.94 0.38 
REM 270 0.3488 0.50888 -1.25 2.51 
SIZE 270 28.5218 1.69602 25.62 33.32 
LEV 270 0.4060 0.17846 0.03 0.86 
ROA 270 0.0932 0.09400 0.00 0.66 
AUD 270 0.4889 0.50080 0.00 1.00 
 
Where, Q is the Tobin's ratio of firm i period t, DACC = period i firm discretionary accrual t, REM = firm 
real earnings management i period t, SIZE = natural logarithm total assets of firm i period t, LEV = firm 
debt period i t, ROA = Return on assets of firm i period t, AUD = variable dummy audit quality is 1 if the 
firm is audited by Big-4 auditors and 0 otherwise. 
 
Based on Table 2 shows that the average value of the sample firms is 1.5053 with a standard 
deviation of 0.93411. The ratio of Q which is above 1 shows a good firms value, while the ratio of Q 
which is below 1 or close to zero shows that the value of the firms is less attractive. The average Q ratio 
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of the sample firms is above which means that the average sample firms is a place for investment 
activities. The average discretionary accrual is 0.0527 with a standard deviation of 0.12919. The average 
discretionary accrual is positive showing that the average sample firms conducts accrual earnings 
management by increasing profits to obtain the desired profit. The average real earnings management is 
0.3488 with a standard deviation value of 0.50888. This shows that sample firms also carry out real 
earnings management to achieve the desired profit target. 
 
Control variables of firm size show an average of 28.5218 with a standard deviation of 1.69602. 
The leverage ratio has an average value of 0.4060 with a standard deviation of 0.17846. The average 
Return on Asset is 0.0932 and the standard deviation is 0.09400. The audit is a dummy variable that is 
worth 1 if the firms is audited by the Big-4 auditors and 0 otherwise. Frequency analysis has been carried 
out on audit quality variables (not attached) indicating that out of a total of 270 observations 138 (51.1%) 
observations were audited by non-big-4 auditors and the remaining 132 (48.9%) were audited by Big-4 
auditors. 
 
Before conducting regression analysis, we conducted a correlation analysis between independent 
variables. The results of the correlation matrix analysis shown in Table 3 show that there is no perfect 
correlation between each independent variable. All correlations are below 0.95. The VIF value also does 
not exceed 10 and the tolerance value is above 0.10. This shows that the variable data used in this study 
did not suffer from multicollinearity problems. 
 
Table 3 Correlations Martix 
 DACC REM SIZE LEV ROA AUD Tolerance VIF 
DACC 1.000      0.898 1.113 
REM -0.268 1.000     0.762 1.312 
SIZE -0.109 -0.054 1.000    0.702 1.425 
LEV 0.044 -0.128 -0.164 1.000   0.935 1.070 
ROA -0.168 0.337 -0.093 0.030 1.000  0.741 1.350 
AUD 0.120 0.115 -0.486 0.146 -0.238 1.000 0.631 1.585 
 
Where, Q is the Tobin's ratio of firm i period t, DACC = period i firm discretionary accrual t, REM = firm 
real earnings management i period t, SIZE = natural logarithm total assets of firm i period t, LEV = firm 
debt period i t, ROA = Return on assets of firm i period t, AUD = variable dummy audit quality is 1 if the 





Regression analysis in this study uses a Multiple Linear Regression analysis approach. The data 
used in this study is a type of panel data, it is necessary to do an autocorrelation analysis to see whether 
between period t residuals have a correlation with period-1 residuals. Durbin-Watson testing is used to 
test autocorrelation. The model does not suffer from autocorrelation problems if the value of DU <DW 
<(4-DU). The results of the Durbin-Watson test show a DW value of 1,968 with a DU value of 1,838 
which means that the regression model does not suffer from autocorrelation problems. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test shows that the value of Monte Carlo Significance is above 0.05, meaning that the data used 
in this study are normally distributed. 
 
The results of testing the coefficient of determination (adjusted R2) produces a value of 0.306 
indicating that the independent variable accrual earnings management and real earnings management as 
well as firm size control variables, leverage, ROA, and audit quality can explain the dependent variable 
that is the firm value of 30.6% and its explained by other factors outside the model. 
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Table 4 presents the results of the linear regression analysis of the research model that was built. 
Discretionary accrual variable which is a measure of accrual earnings management obtains a positive 
coefficient of 0.355 with a significance level that is above 0.05 which is equal to 0.360. These results 
indicate that accrual earnings management carried out by managers to influence earnings figures does not 
have any impact on firm value. These results are not in line with the findings of Gunardi (2013), Indriani 
et al., (2014), and Susanto and Christiawan (2016) who found that accrual earnings management had a 
positive effect on firm value and findings by Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006), Siallagan (2009), and 
Abbas et al., (2017) who found that accrual earnings management had a negative impact on firm value. 
However, this result is in line with the findings of Challen and Siregar (2012) and Dewi et al., (2016) who 
found that accrual earnings management did not affect the value of the firm. The market may assume that 
earnings management is less dangerous or managers cannot detect this practice so that the market does 
not give any response either positively or negatively to accrual earnings management carried out by 
managers. These results are not in line with the expectations of researchers who stated that accrual 
earnings management will have a negative impact on firm value. 
 
Table 4 Result regression analysis 
 Tobins’Q 
Coef. Sig. 
(Constant) -5.629** 0.000 
DACC 0.355 0.360 
REM -0.241* 0.025 
SIZE 0.250** 0.000 
LEV -0.198* 0.473 
ROA 2.230** 0.000 
AUD -0.119* 0.320 
F-Value 20.791** 0.000 
Adjusted R
2
 0.306  
Monte Carlo Sig. 1.071 0.188 
DW-Test 1.968  
 
Where, Q is the Tobin's ratio of firm i period t, DACC = period i firm discretionary accrual t, REM = firm 
real earnings management i period t, SIZE = natural logarithm total assets of firm i period t, LEV = firm 
debt period i t, ROA = Return on assets of firm i period t, AUD = variable dummy audit quality is 1 if the 
firm is audited by Big-4 auditors and 0 otherwise. 
*Represent significance at 5%, **Reprecent significant at 1%. 
 
Real earnings management shows a negative coefficient value of -0.241 with a significance value 
of 0.025 which is below 0.05. These results indicate that real earnings management carried out by 
managers both through sales manipulation, excessive production, and reduction in discretionary expenses 
have a negative impact on firm value. This result is in line with the previous research by Partami et al., 
(2015) which found that real earnings management has a negative effect on firm value. This earnings 
management is considered to be very dangerous by the market because it will cause a negative impact on 
the firm's future cash flow, so the firm detected to practice real earnings management will be responded 
negatively by the market. This result is in accordance with the expectations of the researcher that real 
earnings management will be responded negatively by the market, thereby reducing the value of the firm. 
The leverage control variable was found to have no effect on firm value. In contrast to the findings by 
Nekhili et al., (2017) and Aggarwal and Padhan (2017). The market may assume that the amount of debt 
held by the firm is not meaningful information so it does not affect the value of the firm. Audit quality 
was also found to have no effect on the value of the firm. This finding is different from Afza and Nazir 
(2013), Wang and Huang, (2014), and Ugwunta et al., (2018) who find audit quality can have a positive 
impact on firm value. There are still many cases that ensnare the independent auditor causing the market 
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to assume that the independent auditor cannot be used as a signal. Firm size was found to have a positive 
effect on firm value in line with Carter et al., (2003) and Prasetyorini (2013). The market considers larger 
firms are considered to have lower risks because the technology owned by large firms tends to be more 
sophisticated and better resources. Finally, profitability as measured by ROA has a positive effect on firm 
value in line with Marsha and Murtqi (2017) and Rosikah et al., (2018). Firms that have high profitability 
are considered to have better future prospects than firms with smaller profitability ratios. This also proves 






This paper investigates the effect of accrual earnings management and real earnings management 
on firm value. Earnings management is an opportunistic action carried out by managers to achieve certain 
desired profit figures. The research sample used in this study is that manufacturing firms listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2017 were then selected using the purposive sampling method. 
Empirically this study found that accrual earnings management did not affect the value of the firm. Real 
earnings management has a negative impact on firm value. Control variables namely leverage and audit 
quality have no effect on firm value. Firm size and ROA were found to have a positive impact on firm 
value. 
 
This study provides several important contributions, including; First, provide additional empirical 
evidence in the accrual earnings management literature, real earnings management, and firm value. 
Second, this study provides evidence that earnings management does not provide positive benefits for 
firm value, so it is expected that managers do not need to take this action because it will only have a 
negative impact on the firm's future and not obtain meaningful benefits. Third, this study successfully 
shows that managers use both earnings management techniques namely accrual earnings management and 
real earnings management simultaneously to obtain profit targets. 
 
This study has several limitations, including: First, this study only uses a sample of firms that 
obtain profit figures so that further research can provide earnings management in firms that experience 
losses and their impact on firm value. Second, this research is only limited to the Indonesian context, 
further research can expand the literature on different countries and have a different culture with 
Indonesia. Finally, this study found no influence of accrual earnings management on firm value, further 
research may be able to use different measures of accrual earnings management such as the measurements 
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